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Abstract
We study a sequential (Stackelberg) all-pay auction with two contestants who are privately informed
about a parameter (ability) that a⁄ects their cost of e⁄ort. Contestant 1 (the ￿rst mover) exerts an
e⁄ort in the ￿rst period, while contestant 2 (the second mover) observes the e⁄ort of contestant 1 and
then exerts an e⁄ort in the second period. Contestant 2 wins the contest if his e⁄ort is larger than or
equal to the e⁄ort of contestant 1; otherwise, contestant 1 wins. We characterize the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium of this sequential all-pay auction and analyze the use of head starts to improve the
contestants￿performances. We also study this model when contestant 1 exerts an e⁄ort in the ￿rst period
which translates into an observable output but with some noise. We study two variations of this model
where contestant 1 either knows or does not know the realization of the noise before she chooses her
e⁄ort. Contestant 2 does not know the realization of the noise in both variations. For both variations,
we characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium and investigate the e⁄ect of a random noise on the
contestants￿performance.
Keywords: Sequential all-pay auctions, head starts, noisy outputs.
JEL classi￿cation: D44, O31, O32
￿This paper is a combination of our papers "Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts" and "Sequential all-pay auctions
with noisy outputs".
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11 Introduction
Consider an individual such as a building constructor who needs a service from a service provider . In many
cases this individual will ask constructor A for a price quote and then will reveal this quote to constructor
B and ask for a lower quote. If he refuses to give a lower quote then the job will be given to constructor A.
The constructors or service providers invest time and e⁄ort to correctly evaluate the job at hand in order to
produce a competitive but still pro￿table price quote. This scenario can be likened to a sequential contest
between two contestants which is the focus of this paper. Indeed, in many contest settings, e⁄ort choices
are made sequentially rather than simultaneously. The di⁄erences between simultaneous and sequential
contests have been addressed in the literature by several researchers.1 Baik and Shogren (1992), Leininger
(1993) and Morgan (2003) investigated the question of which form of contest, sequential or simultaneous,
naturally arises in competitive situations. They studied two-player models where contestants compete in the
(generalized) Tullock contest and each contestant is able to choose between two dates to make their e⁄orts.
If the contestants choose di⁄erent dates, a sequential contest occurs, but if they choose the same date the
contest will be a simultaneous one. They all showed that sequential contests may arise endogenously in
equilibrium.2 Despite these important ￿ndings, while numerous studies have dealt with simultaneous all-pay
auctions (all-pay contests) only a few have focused on sequential all-pay auctions. The purpose of this paper
is to ￿ll this gap in the literature by studying a sequential all-pay auction with heterogeneous contestants
under incomplete information.
In the all-pay auction each player submits a bid (e⁄ort) and the player who submits the highest bid
wins the contest, but, independently of success, all players bear the cost of their bids. All-pay auctions
have been studied either under complete information where each player￿ s type (valuation for winning the
contest or ability) is common knowledge3 or under incomplete information where each player￿ s type is private
1Dixit (1987) studied a sequential Tullock contest and examined whether the ability to commit to an e⁄ort choice before
other contestants choose their e⁄ort while assuming that they can then observe this choice is advantageous or not. Linster
(1993) analyzed two-player sequential Tullock contests and showed that if the stronger player is the ￿rst (second) mover in the
sequential contest the players￿total e⁄ort is larger (smaller) than in the simultaneous contest.
2Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) and Mailath (1993) studied sequential oligopoly games and
showed that sequential choices of quantities in a Cournot competition can be the equilibrium outcome of non-cooperative play.
3All-pay auctions under complete information have been studied, among others, by Hillman and Samet (1987), Hillman and
2information and only the distribution from which the players￿types is drawn is common knowledge.4 Most
studies dealing with sequential all-pay auctions assume a two-stage contest under complete information.
Leininger (1991) modeled a patent race between an incumbent and an entrant as a sequential asymmetric
all-pay auction under complete information, and Konrad and Leininger (2007) characterized the equilibrium
of the all-pay auction under complete information in which a group of players choose their e⁄ort ￿ early￿and
the other group of players choose their e⁄ort ￿ late￿ . The assumption of incomplete information complicates
the analysis of the sequential all-pay auction but also makes it more relevant and interesting.
In this work, we study a sequential all-pay auction under incomplete information where the ability of
each contestant is private information. We consider ￿rst a sequential all-pay auction with two contestants
where contestant 1 (the ￿rst mover) exerts an e⁄ort in the ￿rst period, while contestant 2 (the second mover)
observes the e⁄ort of contestant 1 and then exerts an e⁄ort in the second period. Contestant 2 wins the
contest if his e⁄ort is larger than or equal to the e⁄ort of contestant 1; otherwise, contestant 1 wins.5 This
particular type of sequential contest where the players￿outputs are observable in any stage of the contest
has various applications, including sport contests such as athletics and gymnastics, political races in which
the candidates confront each other by a sequence of speeches, and court trials when the lawyers of both
sides make their ￿nal speeches. Moreover, in R&D and other market races it is sometimes the case that
the incumbent observes the output of the leader and only then decides how much e⁄ort to put in. In all
these cases, the players in the later stages have some advantage because they have observed their opponents￿
outputs in the previous stages. Similarly, in our model contestant 2 has an obvious advantage over contestant
1. For this reason contestant 1 exerts a relatively low e⁄ort and sometimes, depending on the distribution
of his opponent￿ s abilities, he might even prefer not to participate in the contest at all (it is worth noting
Riley (1989), Leininger (1991), Baye et al. (1993, 1996), Che and Gale (1998, 2000) and Siegel (2009)).
4All-pay auctions under incomplete information have been studied, among others, by Hillman and Riley (1989), Amann and
Leininger (1996), Krishna and Morgan (1997), Gavious et al. (2003), Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006) and Moldovanu et al.
(2010).
5The concept of Stackelberg games in which players choose their strategies sequentially was introduced and analyzed also
by computer scientists such as Garg and Narahari (2008), Luh et al. (1984) and others. All these authors impose a hierarchical
decision-making structure on a simultaneous game to describe sequential choices of strategies. The solution concept they use
is a Stackelberg equilibrium where the leaders use "secure strategy" that guarantees them a minimal payo⁄ while the followers
use an optimal response strategy.
3that this feature of our model can explain why players sometimes choose to stay out of a contest). Given the
low e⁄ort of contestant 1 in the ￿rst period as well as the rules of the contest according to which contestant
2 needs only to equalize the e⁄ort of contestant 1 in order to win, we have a relatively low expected total
e⁄ort as well as a low expected highest e⁄ort. However, a designer who wishes to maximize the expected
total e⁄ort or the expected highest e⁄ort can change the rules of the sequential all-pay auction to make it
more pro￿table by explicitly or implicitly favoring contestant 1 over contestant 2. In other words, he can
give contestant 1 a head start.
There are numerous examples of real-life sequential contests in which the players who play in the ￿rst stage
are given a head start. Suppose, for example, that Microsoft Corporation is the ￿rst company to produce
a hardware product. Then, if Apple Inc. wants to produce a competitive product, in order to convince
customers to buy this new product it has to be either better or cheaper than the Microsoft product. In that
case, Microsoft is exogenously given a head start. However, head starts can also be given endogenously. For
example, a common situation often occurs in the labor market when an applicant gets a job and then any
new applicant is required to be better in order to win his place. Thus contests with head starts may raise
the contestants￿expected total e⁄ort or alternatively their expected highest e⁄ort. Kirkegaard (2009), for
example, studied asymmetric all-pay auctions with head starts under incomplete information where players
simultaneously choose their e⁄orts. He showed that the total e⁄ort increases if the weak contestant is
favored with a head start, but if the contestants are su¢ ciently heterogenous, then in some cases the weak
contestant should be given both a head start and a handicap.6 Corns and Schotter (1999) demonstrated by
theoretical and empirical arguments that a head start in the form of a price preference policy that is given
to a subset of the ￿rms might not only bene￿t that subset but can actually lower the purchasing cost of the
government. In our sequential all-pay auction therefore we wish to demonstrate that a head start can not
only bene￿t one of the players but can also enhance the overall expected performance of the players. Since in
our setting, contestant 2 has an advantage over contestant 1 because of the timing of their play, we assume
that contestant 1 is given a multiplicative head start which is exogenously determined . That is, contestant
2 will win the contest if his e⁄ort x2 is larger or equal to tx1, where x1 is the e⁄ort of contestant 1 and
6Siegel (2010) provided an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in simultaneous all-pay auctions with head
starts in which players do not choose weakly-dominated strategies.
4t is a constant larger than 1.7 We provide su¢ cient conditions under which by imposing a head start for
contestant 1 the designer of the contest can signi￿cantly increase the expected e⁄orts of both contestants,
particularly the expected total e⁄ort as well as the expected highest e⁄ort. The optimal head start can be
high enough such that several types of contestant 1 will win for sure since no type of contestant 2 will want
to participate. As such, head starts may also play the role of a winning bid in a sequential all-pay auction
when contestant 1 has an incentive to participate independently of the distribution of his opponent￿ s type.
Finally, head starts improve the inherent ine¢ ciency of the sequential all-pay auction. The probability that
a low ability contestant wins against a high ability contestant in a contest with a head start is lower than
in a contest without any head start.
So far in our sequential all-pay auction, e⁄orts translate deterministically into observable outputs such
that the contestant who made the highest e⁄ort is also the one with the highest output and this contestant
wins the contest. However, in real-life contests, the relationship between the contestant￿ s e⁄ort and her
observable output is usually not deterministic. Rather, it is frequently the case that there is some noise in
the process that maps e⁄orts into measured outputs. Contests with outputs which are not deterministically
determined by e⁄orts have received some attention in the literature. For example, Lazear and Rosen (1981)
considered a contestant￿ s output to be a stochastic function of the unobservable e⁄ort and the identity of
the most productive agent to be determined by an external shock. This model is known in the literature
as a rank-order tournament and was later extended and generalized by several authors, e.g., Green and
Stokey (1983), Nalebu⁄ and Stiglitz (1983), Rosen (1986), Krishna and Morgan (1998) and Akerlof and
Holden (2008). The all-pay auction under complete information is actually the limiting case of the rank-
order tournament when the noise approaches zero. In the rest of this paper, similarly to the rank-order
tournament, we assume that the output is a stochastic function of the e⁄ort, but in contrast to the rank-
order tournament model, we analyze sequential all-pay auctions under incomplete information. Thus the
novelty of this part of the paper lies in the fact that we combine incomplete information and noisy outputs in
the same model. This combination is natural in several environments but is quite complex for a theoretical
7This multiplicative head start was chosen for the sake of convenience and may not necessarily be the optimal form of a
head start.
5analysis.8
Formally, contestant 1 exerts an e⁄ort x1 in the ￿rst period, this e⁄ort translates with some noise into
an output that player 2 observes. Thus contestant 2 observes a noisy output of contestant 1￿ s e⁄ort, x1 + t,
where t is the noise term. Then, contestant 2 exerts an e⁄ort x2 in the second period, and wins the contest
if her e⁄ort is larger than or equal to the noisy output of contestant 1, i.e., x2 ￿ x1+t; otherwise, contestant
1 wins. We assume that the random noise t is uniformly distributed on an interval [￿k;k] where k describes
the magnitude of the random noise and determines its variance.9 The smaller the value of k is, the higher
is the contest￿ s accuracy.
We present two variations of the model with noisy outputs. In the ￿rst one we assume that both
contestants do not know the realization of the noise when they exert their e⁄ort. We show that when the
magnitude of the noise, k, increases, then in equilibrium less types of contestant 1 will exert a positive e⁄ort
in the contest. If the magnitude of the random noise is su¢ ciently high, contestant 1 will have no incentive
to exert any positive e⁄ort since anyway she wins with zero e⁄ort. Thus, we focus on a more interesting
case where the magnitude of the random noise is relatively low (k goes to zero). We show that the marginal
e⁄ect of the magnitude of the random noise, k, on the contestants￿strategies goes to zero when k goes to
zero. Thus, we conclude that the equilibrium behavior in the sequential all-pay auction is robust under the
existence of a small noise.
In the second variation of our model with noisy outputs we assume that contestant 1 knows the realization
of the noise when exerting her e⁄ort, while contestant 2 does not. We thus assume that contestant 1 has
more information about the contest than contestant 2. This assumption describes contests in which the
￿rst mover has the opportunity to gather information about the contest environment before exerting an
e⁄ort. This commonly occurs in market situations when one ￿rm identi￿es the market earlier than the other
￿rm which enables her to evaluate correctly the connection between the e⁄ort and the observed output.
8Ederer (2010), for example, also studies a two-stage model that combines incomplete information and noisy outputs.
However, he assumes that players do not know their types before they make their choices in the ￿rst stage while in our model
each player has private information on her type at the outset, from the beginning of the contest.
9The model can be studied for any symmetric distribution of noise but then a closed-form expression for the subgame perfect
equilibrium bid function cannot be derived.
6We show that a positive realization of noise decreases contestant 1￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort for any type who
exerts a positive e⁄ort while a negative realization increases it with respect to the contest without any noise.
Moreover, in equilibrium, the probability that contestant 1 will exert a positive e⁄ort in the contest decreases
in the absolute value of the realization of the noise. Therefore, we conclude that a positive realization of
noise decreases the expected output of contestant 1 with respect to the contest without the noise. The e⁄ect
of a negative realization of the noise is however ambiguous since, on the one hand, it increases the e⁄ort of
contestant 1 for any type who exerts a positive e⁄ort, but on the other, it decreases the incentive to exert a
positive e⁄ort in the contest. It is worth noting that a positive and a negative realizations of the noise with
the same absolute value do not have the same e⁄ect on the contestants￿outputs. However, similarly to the
case when both contestants do not know the realization of the noise, we show that the marginal e⁄ect of the
magnitude of the random noise, k, on the contestants￿strategies goes to zero when k goes to zero. Hence,
independently of the information of the contestants on the random noise, the equilibrium behavior in the
sequential all-pay auction is robust under the existence of a small noise. Furthermore, while in several works
on sequential contests (see, for example, Yildirim 2005 and Ederer 2010) it is shown that the information
revelation policy can a⁄ect the contestants￿choices before and after the release of information, in our model,
if the realization of the noise is su¢ ciently small, then it does not matter how the information about it is
released.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the sequential all-pay auction with
and without head starts . Section 3 presents the sequential all-pay auction with noisy outputs. Section 4
concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The sequential all-pay auction with head starts
We consider ￿rst a sequential all-pay auction with two risk neutral contestants where contestant 1 (the
￿rst mover) exerts an e⁄ort in the ￿rst period, while contestant 2 (the second mover) observes the e⁄ort of
contestant 1 and then exerts an e⁄ort in the second period. Contestant 2 wins the contest if her e⁄ort (x2)
is larger than or equal to the e⁄ort of contestant 1 (x1); otherwise, contestant 1 wins. Both contestants￿
valuation for the prize is 1. The cost of an e⁄ort xi to player i, is xi
ai where ai ￿ 0 is the ability (or type) of
7contestant i which is private information to i.10 Contestants￿abilities are drawn independently. Contestant
i￿ s ability is drawn from the interval [0;1] according to a distribution function Fi which is common knowledge.
We assume that Fi;i = 1;2 has a positive and continuous density function F0
i > 0:
We begin the analysis by considering the equilibrium e⁄ort function of contestant 2 in the second period.
We assume that if both contestants make the same e⁄ort then contestant 2 is the winner. Therefore contestant
2 makes the same e⁄ort as contestant 1 as long as his type a2 is larger than or equal to the e⁄ort of contestant





0 if 0 ￿ a2 < b1(a1)
b1(a1) if b1(a1) ￿ a2 ￿ 1
where we assume that contestant 1 uses a strictly monotonic equilibrium e⁄ort function b1(a1). Contestant
















1(a1) = 0 (2)












Note that if F2 is convex, the S.O.C does not hold and then b1(a1) = 0 for all a1 is the solution of the
maximization problem (1). In the following we assume that F2 is concave (F1 is not necessarily concave).













if ~ a ￿ a1 ￿ 1
(3)





2 (x) ! 1 when x ! 0 then ~ a = 0. This cuto⁄ depends on
the distribution of the second player￿ s ability. If F
0
2 (0) is a ￿nite number then types 0 ￿ a1 ￿ ~ a do not ￿nd
it optimal to exert a positive e⁄ort. As was mentioned above, for the class of convex distribution functions
10An equivalent interpretation is that ai is player￿ s i valuation for the prize and his cost is equal to her bid.
8we have ~ a = 1 such that all types of contestant 1 choose to stay out of the contest (in the following we will
solve this problem by providing an incentive, a head start, for contestant 1 to participate in the contest).
However, if contestant 2￿ s distribution function F2 is concave, we have a real competition in the sequential
all-pay auction even without head starts.








































Note that contestant 2 exerts the same e⁄ort as contestant 1 or else exerts an e⁄ort of zero. Therefore the










The expected total e⁄ort is given by
















Finally, we de￿ne the e¢ ciency (Eff) of the contest as the probability that the contestant with the higher
ability (valuation) wins the contest. If contestant 1 wins the contest it is necessarily true that a2 < b1(a1) ￿































Example 1 Consider a sequential all-pay auction with two contestants whose abilities are distributed accord-
ing to the distribution functions F1(x) = F2(x) = x0:5. By (3), the equilibrium e⁄ort function of contestant





for all a1 ￿ 0


















































In Example 1, the contestants￿expected highest e⁄ort as well as their expected total e⁄ort are signi￿cantly
lower than in the standard all-pay auction where both contestants simultaneously choose their e⁄orts. In
the next subsection we change the rules of the sequential all-pay auction by adding a head start to improve
the contestants￿performances in the contest.
2.1 Head start
In our sequential all-pay auction, contestant 2 has an advantage over contestant 1 because of the timing
of their play. Thus, contestant 1￿ s e⁄ort is relatively low and sometimes, depending on the distribution of
contestant 2￿ s abilities, will choose to stay out of the contest. In that case there is no real competition. Thus
we examine whether the contestants￿performance can be enhanced by using a head start for contestant 1.
By introducing a head start we may also improve the inherent ine¢ ciency of the sequential all-pay contest.
The probability that contestant 1 with a high ability wins against contestant 2 with a low ability is higher
with a head start. In our model, unlike in the symmetric all-pay auction, we can distinguish between the
contestants based on their position - ￿rst or second, even if they are ex-ante symmetric (their types are
drawn from the same distribution). Thus we may give the headstart to the ￿rst player.
We want the head start to be independent of the contestant￿ s e⁄ort and therefore we introduce a mul-
tiplicative head start. We therefore assume that contestant 2 will win the contest if her e⁄ort x2 is larger
than or equal to tx1 where x1 is the e⁄ort of contestant 1 and t is a constant larger than 1. The equilibrium





0 if 0 ￿ a2 < t￿1(a1)
t￿1(a1) if t￿1(a1) ￿ a2 ￿ 1
10where we assume that contestant 1 uses a strictly monotonic equilibrium e⁄ort function ￿1(a1). Contestant



































Thus, if F2 is concave, the equilibrium e⁄ort of contestant 1 with type a1 is given by
￿1(a1) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :









if b a ￿ a1 ￿ a￿
1
t if a￿ ￿ a1 ￿ 1
(7)
where b a is de￿ned as b a = 1
tF 0
2(0) and a￿ is the minimum between 1 and the solution to the following equation







Note that a￿ ￿ b a since F0
2 is a decreasing function and from the concavity of F2 we also know that F0
2 (0) > 1.
Furthermore, if 1 ￿ t ￿ 1
F 0
2(1), then a￿ = 1 and only when t > 1
F 0
2(1) does there exist a cuto⁄ type 0 < a￿ < 1
and an interval of types a￿ ￿ a1 ￿ 1 who exert the e⁄ort ￿1 (a1) = 1
t and win for sure (this serves as a
winning bid).













































The expected total e⁄ort is therefore


























11Note that the expected e⁄ort of contestant 1 is not always higher than the expected e⁄ort of contestant 2
as was the case without a head start and therefore the expected highest e⁄ort is not equal to the expected



















































The ￿rst term describes those types of contestant 2 who choose to stay out of the contest (0 ￿ a2 < t￿1(a1))
in which case the highest e⁄ort is equal to that of contestant 1, ￿1 (a1) = 1
t(F0
2)￿1( 1
ta1). The second term
describes those types of contestant 2 who equalize the e⁄ort of contestant 1 multiplied by t in which case
the highest e⁄ort is equal to t￿1 (a1) = (F0
2)￿1( 1
ta1). The last term describes those types of contestant 1 who
win for sure by choosing the winning bid.
Example 2 Consider a sequential all pay auction with two contestants where F1(x) = F2(x) = x0:5. By






















< a1 ￿ 1






















































Figure 1 presents the expected total e⁄ort as a function of t.











Figure 1: expected total e⁄ort as a function of the headstart










and the expected total e⁄ort is then
TE(ttotal) = 0:16492






















































Figure 2 presents the expected highest e⁄ort as a function of t.













Figure 2: expected highest e⁄ort as a function of the headstart















and the expected highest e⁄ort is then
HE(thigh) = 0:1468
From Examples 1 and 2 we can see that the optimal head start signi￿cantly increases the contestants￿
expected highest e⁄ort as well as their expected total e⁄ort.
Below we discuss the equilibrium behavior of the contestants when the distribution function of contestant
2￿ s types is convex rather than concave (again, there is no restriction on the distribution of contestant 1￿ s
types). When F2 is convex and a head start t > 1 is given to contestant 1 then the equilibrium e⁄ort of





0 if 0 ￿ a2 < t￿1(a1)
t￿1(a1) if t￿1(a1) ￿ a2 ￿ 1









t ￿ a1 ￿ 1
14Note that when F2 is convex and a head start is given to contestant 1 some of contestant 1￿ s types participate
in the contest. In this case the expected total e⁄ort and the expected highest e⁄ort are the same and are








We now turn to examine the conditions under which a head start is bene￿cial in the sequential all-pay
auction with a concave F2. Namely we identify the conditions on the distribution of the contestants￿abilities
that ensure that a head start increases the expected highest e⁄ort or the expected total e⁄ort. The following
condition is required for establishing the e⁄ects of a head start on contestant 1￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort. Let







represent the equilibrium e⁄ort function of contestant 1 in the sequential all-pay
auction without a head start, when ~ a ￿ a1 ￿ 1.
Condition 1 The function b1 (a1) is strictly convex for all ~ a ￿ a1 ￿ 1:
If Condition 1 is satis￿ed11, any head start t close to 1 increases the expected e⁄ort of contestant 1 since
then, for t > 1 and ~ a ￿ a1 ￿ 1 we have b1 (a1) < 1
tb1 (ta1) = ￿1 (a1). Given that without any head start, the
expected highest e⁄ort is equal to the expected e⁄ort of contestant 1, we obtain the following result about
the positive e⁄ect of a head start on the expected highest e⁄ort in the contest.
Proposition 1 If Condition 1 holds, then the expected highest e⁄ort in the sequential all-pay auction with
a head start 1 < t ￿ 1
F 0
2(1) is higher than the expected highest e⁄ort in the sequential all-pay auction without
any head start.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now examine the e⁄ect of a head start on the expected e⁄ort of contestant 2. On the one hand, the
e⁄ort of every type of contestant 1 increases when a head start is given and therefore contestant 2 should
also increase his e⁄ort if he wants to win the contest. But, on the other hand, by giving a head start to
contestant 1, low types of contestant 2 will prefer to stay out of the contest since the minimal e⁄ort which
is required from them in order to win is relatively high.
11Note that if this condition holds then the density function F0
2 (x) is convex. This follows by taking the derivative w.r.t. a of
both sides of the equality F0
2 (b1 (a)) = 1
a. We get ￿a2F00
2 (b1 (a))b0
1 (a) = 1. Taking the derivative w.r.t. a of both sides of this
equality and rearranging yields the following equality b00






2 (b1(a)) and since by our assumptions
F00
2 (b1 (a)) < 0 and b0
1 (a) > 0 we conclude that b00
1 (a) > 0 ) F000
2 (b1 (a)) > 0:
15The following conditions are required for establishing the e⁄ect of a head start on the e⁄ort of contestant
2.
Condition 2 The function G(x) = (1 ￿ F2 (x))x is concave.12
If condition 2 holds then we can de￿ne the argument that maximizes G(x) on the interval [0;1],
x￿ = arg max
x2[0;1]
G(x)
Condition 3 The highest equilibrium e⁄ort of contestant 1 (the e⁄ort of type a1 = 1) in the contest without
a head start is lower than x￿. Formally,
b1 (1) = (F0
2)
￿1 (1) < x￿
Using conditions 1, 2 and 3 we obtain a positive e⁄ect of a relatively small head start on the expected
e⁄ort of contestant 2 as well.
Proposition 2 If Conditions 1,2 and 3 hold, then for t > 1 su¢ ciently close to 1, the expected e⁄ort of
contestant 2 increases in t:
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that all the three conditions 1,2 and 3 hold for a large class of distribution functions including,
for example, every concave distribution function of the form F (x) = x￿;0 < ￿ < 1. The combination of
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 yields the result that the use of a head start in the sequential all pay auction
is bene￿cial for a designer who wishes to maximize the expected total e⁄ort.
Proposition 3 If Conditions 1,2 and 3 hold, then the expected total e⁄ort in the sequential all-pay auction
with a head start t > 1 which is su¢ ciently close to 1 is higher than the expected total e⁄ort in the two-player
sequential all-pay auction without any head start.
By Proposition 3, a head start t > 1 that is su¢ ciently close to 1 increases the expected highest e⁄ort
as well as the expected total e⁄ort. However, we cannot conclude that the optimal head start for a designer
12The failure (or hazard) rate of F is given by the function ￿(x) ￿ F0 (x)=[1 ￿ F (x)]: F is said to have an increasing failure
rate (IFR) if ￿(x) is increasing in x. The IFR condition implies Condition 2.
16who wishes to maximize the expected highest or total e⁄ort is close to 1. Note that for 1 < t ￿ 1
F 0
2(1) the
e⁄ort of every type of contestant 1 is higher than in the contest without a head start. However, for t > 1
F 0
2(1)
the e⁄ort of low types of contestant 1 is higher than in the contest without a head start but the e⁄ort of the
high types in the contest with a head start is not necessarily higher than their e⁄orts in the contest without
a head start. In this case, the head start serves as a winning bid and therefore some high types will choose
the winning bid but not any bid above it as they might have done without the head start. Nevertheless,
as we can see from Example 2, the optimal head starts (that induce the highest expected total e⁄ort and
the highest expected highest e⁄ort) might be obtained for t > 1
F 0
2(1) although such a head start does not
necessarily increase the e⁄ort of all possible contestants￿types.
Finally, for t close enough to 1, we can express the e¢ ciency in terms of the headstart by (in this case it
































We can see that the e¢ ciency is increasing with t (recall that b a is decreasing with t). Thus, we conclude
that a headstart also improves the e¢ ciency of the contest.
3 The sequential all-pay auction with noisy outputs
We consider now a sequential all-pay auction with two risk neutral contestants where contestant 1 (the ￿rst
mover) exerts an e⁄ort x1 in the ￿rst period, while contestant 2 (the second mover) observes an output of
x1 + t where t represents a random noise that is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [￿k;k];
0 ￿ k ￿ 1
2 and this information is common knowledge. The value of k determines the variance of the random
noise and the smaller the value of k is the higher is the contest￿ s accuracy. Contestant 2 exerts an e⁄ort
x2 in the second period, and wins the contest if the e⁄ort x2 is larger than or equal to x1 + t; otherwise,
contestant 1 wins. The valuation of both contestants for the prize is 1. An e⁄ort xi costs xi
ai where ai ￿ 0
is the ability (or type) of contestant i which is private information to i. Contestant i￿ s ability is drawn
independently from the interval [0;1] according to a cumulative distribution function Fi which is common
17knowledge. We assume that Fi;i = 1;2 has a positive and continuous density function F0
i > 0: Since the
ability of the players is distributed on [0;1] we can assume that the output is limited to this interval and
therefore we assume that if x1 + t ￿ 0; then contestant 2 observes an output of zero while if x1 + t ￿ 1 she
observes an output of 1.
3.1 Symmetric information
Assume that both contestants do not know the realization of the noise t when exerting their e⁄ort. If
contestant 1 exerts an e⁄ort of b1 (a1) in the ￿rst period, contestant 2 observes a noisy output of b1 (a1)+t.





0 if a2 < b1 (a1) + t
b1 (a1) + t if a2 ￿ b1 (a1) + t
(10)
In the following, we assume that k ￿ 1
2 and that F2 is concave. Then we can show (see the proof of
Proposition 4) that contestant 1￿ s equilibrium strategy satis￿es k ￿ b1(a1) ￿ 1￿k: In that case, contestant￿ s




























2 (b1 (a1) + t)dt < 0 (12)
If F2 is concave then the S.O.C. holds everywhere. Thus, according to the above analysis, contestant 1￿ s
equilibrium strategy is as follows:
Proposition 4 In the sequential all-pay auction, for every concave distribution function F2, the equilibrium
strategy of contestant 1 is given by b1 (a1) = 0 for all 0 ￿ a1 < a￿
1; and for all a1 ￿ a￿




F2 (b1(a1) + k) ￿
1
2k




18The cuto⁄ type a￿


















1) is implicitly de￿ned by (13).
Proof. See Appendix.
In the following we use Proposition 4 to illustrate the contestants￿behavior in a sequential all-pay auction.
Example 3 Assume a sequential all-pay auction where contestant 2￿ s type is distributed according to F2 (x) =

























1 ￿ a1 ￿ 1
The cuto⁄ type a￿






































where c is the solution to the equation
4c3 ￿ 3c4 + 4 = 0 ) c ’ 1:6372




k and therefore for all a1 ￿ a￿
1.
Moreover, for a given type a1 who exerts a positive e⁄ort, the e⁄ort is increasing in k. Note also that a￿
1




4 : Finally, note that
a￿




= 0:37308. That is, if k > 0:37308 contestant 1; independent of her type, exerts an
e⁄ort of b1 = 0:
19Our goal in the following is to examine the e⁄ect of the size of the interval of the random noise, k, on the
contestants￿behavior, and particularly on the expected highest output in the contest. The expected highest

















where b1(a1) is de￿ned by (13). If k is su¢ ciently large, no type of contestant 1 will exert a positive e⁄ort
(i.e., a￿
1 = 1). The following example illustrates contestant 1￿ s expected e⁄ort in the contest.
Example 4 Consider a sequential all-pay auction with two contestants whose types are distributed according




























Figure 3 depicts the expected highest e⁄ort as a function of k:









Figure 3: The expected highest e⁄ort as a function of k
We next show that the cuto⁄type a￿
1 increases in k for any (concave) distribution of contestant 2￿ s types.
Proposition 5 The ex-ante probability that contestant 1 will exert a positive e⁄ort in the sequential all-pay






The e⁄ect of the magnitude of the random noise on the contestants￿expected e⁄orts is ambiguous. On
the one hand, from the above proposition, it decreases the ex-ante probability that contestant 1 will exert a
positive e⁄ort, but, on the other, in some cases it increases the e⁄ort of contestant 1 for any given type (as
in Example 3 where b1 (a1) is increasing in k). However, the following result shows that if the magnitude of
the random noise k is small enough, then it has no e⁄ect on the expected e⁄ort of contestant 1.
Proposition 6 In the sequential all-pay auction, if F0
2 (x) ! 1 when x ! 0; the marginal e⁄ect of the







Note that the condition in the above proposition, F0
2 (x) ! 1 when x ! 0, holds, for example, for all
concave distribution functions of the form F (x) = x￿;0 < ￿ < 1. Moreover, since contestant 2 only equalizes
the output of contestant 1 the e⁄ect of the random noise is similar on both contestants. Thus, we conclude
that a relatively small noise in the sequential all-pay contest does not result in a dramatic change in the
contestants￿output. In other words, the sequential all-pay auction is robust under a small noise with respect
to the contestants￿outputs.
3.2 Asymmetric information
In many market situations the ￿rst player to arrive at the market gathers the available information and can
successfully evaluate the connection between her e⁄ort and the observable output. Assume therefore that
contestant 2 does not know the value of the realization of the noise t which is uniformly distributed on the
interval [￿k;k]; while contestant 1 knows the realization of t before she exerts her e⁄ort. Note, however,
that contestant 2￿ s behavior will not be change when contestant 1 knows the realization of t. Then, as in





0 if a2 < b1 (a1) + t
b1 (a1) + t if a2 ￿ b1 (a1) + t









The F.O.C. is then
F0






2 (b1 (a1) + t) < 0 (18)
We assume again that F2 is concave. Thus, contestant 1￿ s equilibrium strategy is as follows:
Proposition 7 In the sequential all-pay auction, for every concave distribution function F2, the equilibrium





0 if a1 < a
(F0
2)￿1( 1
a1) ￿ t if a1 ￿ a
(19)
If 0 ￿ t ￿ (F0
2)























Finally, if t > (F0
2)
￿1 (1) then a = 1
Note that b1(a1) + t < 1 for all a1 ￿ 1 and therefore the maximization problem (16) is well de￿ned.
Moreover, if t > (F0
2)
￿1 (1) then all types of contestant 1 exert a zero e⁄ort. If t < 0; the cuto⁄ ￿ a = a￿￿ is the
type whose expected payo⁄ is equal to zero when a positive e⁄ort is exerted. Finally, given the realization
of the noise t, contestant 1￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort is (weakly) increasing in her type.
By Proposition 7, a positive noise decreases contestant 1￿ s output and a negative noise increases it with
respect to the situation without any noise. The noise, either negative or positive, increases the cuto⁄, that
is, it decreases the ex-ante probability that contestant 1 will exert a positive e⁄ort. Thus, a positive noise
22necessarily decreases contestant 1￿ s expected output. However, the e⁄ect of a negative noise on contestant 1￿ s
expected output is ambiguous since, on the one hand, it increases the e⁄ort, but, on the other, it increases the
probability that contestant 1 will exert a zero e⁄ort. Note that if contestant 1 exerts a positive e⁄ort when t
is positive as well as when t is negative with the same absolute value, then by (19) her e⁄ort when the noise is
negative is higher by 2t than when the noise is positive. However, a positive noise and a negative noise, even
if they have the same absolute value, by (20) and (21) will a⁄ect di⁄erently contestant 1￿ s decision whether
or not to exert a positive e⁄ort. The following result provides a condition on the distribution function of
contestant 2￿ s types for which a negative noise encourages a larger set of contestant 1￿ s types to exert a
positive e⁄ort in the contest than a positive noise with the same absolute value. Thus, this result also
provides a condition according to which a negative noise is better than a positive one with the same absolute
value from the viewpoint of a designer who wishes to maximize the expected highest output.
Proposition 8 In a sequential all-pay contest with t ￿ (F0
2)





Then, if contestant 1 exerts a positive e⁄ort with a positive noise t; she also exerts a positive e⁄ort with a
negative noise of ￿t; i.e., we have
a￿￿ ￿ a￿
In that case, a negative noise of ￿t yields a higher expected output of contestant 1 than a positive noise of t:
Proof. See Appendix.
Condition (22) is satis￿ed in particular for all concave distribution functions of the form F2(t) = t￿ ,for
0 < ￿ ￿ 1
2: Thus, for all these distribution functions, a negative noise yields a higher expected output of
contestant 1 than a positive noise with the same absolute value.











23If t is uniformly distributed on the interval [￿k;k] and k ￿ (F0
2)
￿1 (1), the expected output of contestant

















































1(a1)da1 ￿ t(1 ￿ F1(a￿￿))
￿
dt
In the following example, we illustrate the equilibrium strategy and the e⁄ect of a random noise on the
expected highest output in a sequential all-pay auction.
Example 5 Consider a sequential all-pay auction where both contestants￿types are distributed according to
F(x) = x0:5: Then, by (19), (20) and (21) for 0 ￿ t ￿ 1








4 ￿ t if a1 ￿ 2
p
t
0 if a1 < 2
p
t








4 ￿ t if a1 ￿ 2
p
￿t
0 if a1 < 2
p
￿t
By (24), the expected output of contestants 1 is
1) for t ￿ 0































Then for all 0 ￿ t ￿ 1
4; we have dTE1
dt ￿ 0; that is, any positive noise decreases the expected output of
contestant 1 compared to the case without any noise.
2) for t < 0


































24Thus, for all t > ￿0:04939; dTE
dt ￿ 0 and for all t < ￿0:04939; dTE
dt ￿ 0: In other words, a small negative
noise increases contestant 1￿expected output, and a large negative noise decreases it. We plot the expected
highest e⁄ort as a function of the realization of the noise t in Figure 4.









Figure 4: The expected highest e⁄ort as a function of t
























































In Figure 5 we can see that the expected e⁄ort of contestant 1 decreases in the magnitude of the random
noise k:








Figure 5: The expected highest e⁄ort as a function of k
In the above example, although the random noise is symmetrically distributed around zero, the equi-
librium output of contestant 1 is not symmetric, i.e., b1(a1;t) 6= b1(a1;￿t) and, in particular the expected
highest e⁄ort is not symmetric around zero as can be seen in Figure 4. In the following, we show that
when the magnitude of the noise k is small enough the e⁄ect of the negative noises will be positive and will
balance the negative e⁄ect of the positive noises such that the overall e⁄ect of random noise on contestant
1￿ s expected e⁄ort will be zero.
Proposition 9 In the sequential all-pay auction, if F0
2 (x) ! 1 when x ! 0; the marginal e⁄ect of the







Proposition 9 demonstrates that the sequential all-pay auction is robust under a small noise in contestant
1￿ s output when she knows the realization of the noise before she exerts the e⁄ort. Thus, by Propositions 6
and 9 we can conclude that with either symmetric or asymmetric information on the realization of random
noise, a relatively small noise has no e⁄ect on the expected highest e⁄ort.
264 Concluding remarks
We presented a model of two-players sequential all-pay auction with incomplete information. We character-
ized the equilibrium behavior of the contestants and derived expressions for the expected total and highest
e⁄orts. Then we analyzed the implications of using a head start mechanism in which the ￿rst mover is
favored over the second one. This head start, on the one hand, encourages the ￿rst mover to exert higher
e⁄orts but, on the other, may cause the second mover to withdraw from the contest. We demonstrated that
in our model the allocation of head starts increases the expected highest e⁄ort as well as the expected total
e⁄ort. It seems natural to generalize the sequential all-pay auction to the case with n > 2 contestants. In
this generalized model (without head starts) contestants arrive one by one, contestant j;j ￿ n; wins if his
e⁄ort is larger than or equal to the e⁄orts of all the contestants in the previous periods and his e⁄ort is larger
than the e⁄orts of all the contestants in the following periods. However, the characterization of the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the generalize model with and without head starts is not tractable for all forms of the
distribution functions of the contestants￿types.
We also established the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in the sequential all-pay auction with
noisy outputs. We showed that when the noise is uniformly distributed around zero, this auction is robust in
the sense that the marginal e⁄ect of small noises on the contestants￿expected highest e⁄ort is zero. In other
words, in a sequential all-pay auction, small noises do not have a dramatic e⁄ect on the contestants￿output
with respect to the contest without any noise. Owing to the complexity of the environment we focused here
on a speci￿c distribution of the random noise, namely, the uniform distribution. However, we conjecture that
our results will hold for other distributions of random noise as long as they are symmetrically distributed
around zero.
We assumed for simplicity that contestant 1￿ s output is subject to a random noise. If we will assume that
contestant 2￿ s output is also subject to a random noise and that the noises are independent random variables
then the nature of our results do not change. This is true since contestant 2￿ s behavior is characterized by a
cuto⁄. Contestant 2 will exert a positive e⁄ort i⁄ his type is larger than or equal to the observable output
of contestant 1 plus a constant. This follows from the fact that his expected payo⁄ will still be linear in his
e⁄ort. Thus we can implicitly de￿ne contestant 1￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort function and derive similar results.
275 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The expected highest e⁄ort in the two-players model without a head start is equal to contestant 1￿ s expected
e⁄ort, while the expected highest e⁄ort in the two-player model with a head start is larger than or equal to
contestant 1￿ s expected e⁄ort. Thus, in order to prove that a head start increases the expected highest e⁄ort
it is su¢ cient to show that a head start increases contestant 1￿ s expected e⁄ort. However, what we actually
show is even stronger. We show that for every type of contestant 1 who made a positive e⁄ort when there
was no head start, this e⁄ort increases when a head start is given. Therefore we show that























Moreover the lowest type of contestant 1 who is active in the two-player model with a head start is lower
than the lowest active type of contestant 1 in the two-player model without any head start. Formally,
































> b1 (a1) = 0 for all b a ￿ a1 ￿ e a
￿1 (a1) = b1(a1) = 0 for all 0 ￿ a1 ￿ b a
and the expected e⁄ort of contestant 1 with a head start t is higher than his expected e⁄ort without any
head start. Q:E:D:
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The expected e⁄ort of contestant 2 given an e⁄ort ￿1 (a1;t) > 0 of contestant 1 is
E2(t;a1) = (1 ￿ F2 (t￿1 (a1;t)))t￿1 (a1;t)

















is increasing in a1 as well as in t. By Condition 3 we know that
(F0
2)
￿1 (1) < x￿. Therefore we obtain that, for t > 1 close enough to 1 and for all a1 ￿ 1;












So far we showed that given a type b a ￿ a1 ￿ 1 of contestant 1 that exerts a positive e⁄ort, the expected
e⁄ort of contestant 2 increases in t as long as t is su¢ ciently close to 1. By Condition 1, the interval of








￿ 0 and therefore, if t

















5.3 Proof of Proposition 4
We wish to characterize the equilibrium e⁄ort function b1 (a1) of contestant 1 when the equilibrium e⁄ort
function of contestant 2 is given by (10). We divide our analysis into the following three cases: 1. b1(a1) < k
2. b1(a1) > 1 ￿ k and 3. k ￿ b1(a1) ￿ 1 ￿ k.




























































2 (b1 + k)
Since F0
2 (b1 + k) > 0, the S.O.C. does not hold and therefore the maximum is never achieved at an internal
e⁄ort b1 2 (0;k).


































Let a1 = 1: Then if b1(1) > 1 ￿ k we obtain
1
2k
(1 ￿ F2 (b1(1) ￿ k)) <
1
2k
(1 ￿ F2 (1 ￿ 2k)) <
1
2k
(1 ￿ (1 ￿ 2k)) = 1
The second inequality is due to our assumption that F2 is concave. This inequality contradicts equation (26)
and therefore b1(1) < 1 ￿ k; which implies by the monotonicity of b1 that b1(a1) < 1 ￿ k for all a1 ￿ 1:




























2 (b1 + t))dt < 0




F2 (b1 + k) ￿
1
2k
F2 (b1 ￿ k) =
1
a1
30where b1(a1) is a an increasing function. The cuto⁄ type a￿
1 is the type who is indi⁄erent between an e⁄ort


















1) is implicitly de￿ned by (13). By the analysis in case (1) it is possible that an interval of types
will ￿nd it optimal to exert b1 = k. We show next, however, that no such interval exists. Denote by ^ a1 the










Since F2 is concave, ^ a1 is between 0 and 1. If contestant 1 with type a1 exerts an e⁄ort of b1 = 0; then
her expected payo⁄ is ￿a1 (0) = 1
2k
R k
0 F2 (t)dt; while if she exerts an e⁄ort of k her expected payo⁄ is
￿a1 (k) = 1
2k
R k
￿k F2 (k + t)dt￿ k
a1. Recall that we already showed that she will never exert an e⁄ort strictly
between 0 and k: The di⁄erence between these expected payo⁄s is given by




























By the de￿nition of ^ a1; we obtain that ￿(a1) is positive for all a1 < ^ a1. Thus, all types of contestant 1
that are smaller than ^ a1 will exert an e⁄ort of b1 = 0: Therefore no type a1 < ^ a1 can be indi⁄erent between
an e⁄ort of zero and an e⁄ort given by (13) (since by the monotonicity of the e⁄ort function given in (13),
b1 (a1) < k). Therefore a￿
1 ￿ ^ a1. Finally, all a1 2 [^ a1;a￿
1] prefer an e⁄ort of zero over an e⁄ort given by (13).
































Therefore all a1 2 [^ a1;a￿
1] prefer an e⁄ort of zero. Note that all types which are larger than a￿
1 will exert an
e⁄ort according to (13), and particularly, since b1 (a1) is a monotonically increasing function, all the positive
e⁄orts are larger than k: Q:E:D:
315.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Recall that a￿













F2 (t)dt = 0
where b1(a￿









￿k F2 (b1(a1) + t)dt + 1
2kF2 (b1(a1) + k) + 1
2kF2 (b1(a1) ￿ k) + 1
2k2
R k




































F2 (b1(a1) + t)dt




dk > 0. Q:E:D:
5.5 Proof of Proposition 6
If F0




F2 (b1(a1) + k) ￿
1
2k











for all a1 ￿ 0
Note that if F0






will exert zero e⁄ort since the solution








is b1 = 0. But when F0
2 (x) ! 1 when x ! 0, all positive types ￿nd it optimal to exert a positive e⁄ort in
the limit when k goes to zero.
























2 (b1 + k) + F0
2 (b1 ￿ k)) ￿ 1




2 (b1 + k) ￿ F0
2 (b1 ￿ k))
Since F
0
2 (b1) = limk!0
￿ 1




2 (b1) = limk!0
￿ 1
2k(F0
2 (b1 + k) ￿ F0
















Moreover, from the above we know that limk!0 a￿
1(k) = 0 if F0








5.6 Proof of Proposition 8
Given a positive realization and a negative realization of the noise with the same absolute value we let



















If we replace a￿￿ by a￿ in the L.H.S. of the last equation we obtain
F2(v) ￿ F0
2(v)2v (28)
Thus, if (28) is positive, contestant 1 with type a￿ has a positive expected payo⁄ when the realization of the
noise is ￿v: Since the expected payo⁄ of contestant 1 increases in her type, and the expected payo⁄ of type
a￿￿ is zero when the realization of the noise is ￿v, we obtain that a￿￿ ￿ a￿: Q:E:D:
335.7 Proof of Proposition 9
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